Using an oligopoly model of trade with asymmetric costs, we study the individual and world welfare implications of a hub and spoke trade agreement where the hub country is more e¢ cient than spoke countries. Under a hub and spoke trade regime, the hub country can bene…t at the expense of the spokes relative to free trade. Furthermore, if the hub is su¢ ciently e¢ cient compared to the spokes, such a regime can yield higher global welfare than free trade. Preferential treatment of the e¢ cient hub country in its export markets improves world welfare because it helps allocate a larger share of the world's output to a low cost location.
Introduction
One of the striking features of today's global policy landscape is the widespread prevalence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). As per the World Trade Organization's (WTO) o¢ cial website, as of 2011, all but one of the WTO 153 members is a party to at least one PTA (Mongolia is the exception), and on average each WTO member country belongs to 13 PTAs. We even observe today that PTAs are in discussion with each other regarding mutual liberalization. While the existing customs unions involve some of the major economies of the world, Free Trade Areas (FTAs) constitute an overwhelming majority of PTAs, accounting for 83 percent of all PTAs. 1 Since FTA members impose individually optimal tari¤s on non-members, a member country of a bilateral FTA is free to form an independent bilateral FTA with an existing non-member and create a hub and spoke type trading regime. 2 For example, Mexico, as a member of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has FTAs with the European Union (EU), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Chile, Israel, Japan, and many others. This di¤erence has important implications given the fact that countries belong to several PTAs in today's world trading system. The goal of this paper is to contribute to the literature by deriving the individual and world welfare implications of hub and spoke regimes relative to global free trade under an oligopoly model of trade when costs are asymmetric.
We employ an n-country oligopoly model of trade under a reciprocal dumping framework of Brander and Krugman (1983) . Under the hub and spoke regime, there is one hub country and the other countries are spokes. We assume that hub country has lower marginal cost of production relative to symmetric spoke countries. We …nd that the hub country bene…ts so much from such preferential liberalization that it is better o¤ relative to global free trade. 3 This results stems from two facts: (i) relative to free trade, export pro…ts of the hub country increase in spoke countries' markets due to preferential treatment; (ii) due to market segmentation, the domestic surplus of the hub country does not change relative to free trade since its own tari¤ equals zero under both regimes. The ‡ip side of this result is that the spoke countries are worse o¤ relative to global free trade. This result formally validates the intuition that the hub can bene…t at the expense of the spokes. Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992) shows a similar result for economies under perfect 1 In the extensive literature on FTAs, welfare e¤ects of FTAs are generally discussed in the form of tari¤ complementarity e¤ects these agreements yield. See Staiger (1997, 1998) , Yi (2000) , and Ornelas (2005) for further details. See Richardson (1995) on the incentives for member countries of FTAs to reduce their external tari¤s. See Bhagwati et. al. (1999) and Kowalczyk (1999) for a collection of many important articles in the PTA literature. 2 If a PTA is a customs union, due to joint determination of external tari¤s, expansion can only take the form of new membership. When the PTA is a free trade area, however, each member can negotiate individually with outside countries. Using a network formation game, Furusawa and Konishi (2007) points out this important di¤erence in a model of endogeneous formation of PTAs.
3 Similar result arises in Goyal and Joshi (2006) that endogenizes the FTA formation with exogenous tari¤s and Mukonoki and Tachi (2006) in a setting of sequential negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements. Unlike the present paper, both of these papers assume symmetry across countries competition: a large country may prefer hub and spoke regime to global free trade. Kowalczyk (2000) shows that a small country has incentives to seek access to many large country-free trade areas thereby becoming a hub itself. 4 We complement these results by using an oligopoly model of trade with asymmetric costs.
Further analysis under cost asymmetry yields a remarkable result that has been overlooked in the existing literature: hub and spoke trading arrangement can yield higher global welfare than free trade. This result obtains when the hub country is su¢ ciently low cost relative to spoke countries. Under such a scenario, preferential treatment of the hub country in its export markets improves world welfare because it helps allocate a larger share of the world's output to a low cost location. In other words, the gains from allocative e¢ ciency may exceed the losses stemming from the persisting tari¤s between spoke countries. Note that this result is closely linked to the Industrial Organization literature: helping ine¢ cient …rms may reduce social welfare (e.g., Lahiri and Ono, 1988 ). 5 However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous papers have pointed out the role of a hub and spoke trade system to enhance the allocative e¢ ciency.
The existing literature on the economic e¤ects of hub and spoke trade systems generally approach these agreements in a pessimistic way because of their discriminatory nature and lessdiscriminatory PTAs, such as CUs, are argued to be more preferable (see Kowalczyk and Wonnacott, 1992; Blackhurst and Henderson, 1993 and Krueger, 1997) . Here, we argue that global reallocation of production towards e¢ cient sources can reverse these arguments. In a similar framework as ours, Mukunoki and Tachi (2006) studies sequential negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements and examines the implications of hub and spoke agreements for the multilateral free trade. We complement Mukonoki and Tachi (2006) and Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992) by examining the scenario where countries are asymmetric with respect to production cost.
Model
We employ an oligopoly model of international trade where each country has a unilateral incentive to impose rent extracting tari¤s (unless it commits not to do so via an FTA). There are n countries and two goods: x and y. We assume that preferences over the two goods are quasilinear: U (x; y) = u(x) + y. Good x is produced by a single …rm in each country at a constant marginal cost (in terms of the numeraire good y). Given our focus, we initially consider a hub and spoke trading regime where country i is the hub country while the other n 1 countries are spokes that impose external tari¤s on each other. Such a regime is denoted by hfihgi while global free trade is denoted by hfF gi. Let c > 0 denote spoke …rms'marginal cost of producing good x and marginal cost of 4 Similarly, in Puga and Venables (1997), due to agglomeration e¤ects, the formation of a hub and spoke arrangement bene…ts the hub whereas it can hurt the spoke nations by making location in the hub more attractive to …rms. For further discussion see Wonnacott (1996) . 5 Collie ( We employ a two-stage game under the hub and spoke trade regime. In the …rst stage, spoke countries impose their optimal tari¤s. Then, taking the trade policy regime and the associated tari¤s as given, …rms compete in Cournot fashion. 6 For simplicity in notation, while each spoke country has an n 1 dimensional tari¤ vector, we write pro…t, domestic surplus and total welfare as a function of the tari¤ it imposes on the hub country (zero tari¤) and the symmetric MFN tari¤ spoke countries impose on each other. It is useful to clarify our notation with an example: in the export pro…t function jz (0, t z ), the …rst argument is the tari¤ faced by the hub country i in spoke country z's market while the second argument is the tari¤ faced by all other spoke exporters, where z 6 = i and z 6 = j. Moreover, at the risk of slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes write pro…t, domestic surplus, and total welfare as a function of the policy regime itself. For example, s i (F ) denotes country i's welfare under free
Hub and Spoke Regime
Under the hub and spoke regime hfihgi, due to market segmentation, it is su¢ cient to focus on the hub country and only one of the spoke country's market (say country z). Let x jz denote country j's exports to country z where z 6 = j; x zz the sales of …rm z in country z; and x z = x zz + X j6 =z
x jz denote total sales of good x in country z. While a spoke country's (say country j) exports of good x to another spoke country (say country z) are subject to a speci…c tari¤ t z per unit, the hub …rm has a free access. 7 Let country z's tari¤ vector be denoted by t z and the global tari¤ vector be denoted by t. Then, the hub country's (country i) and a spoke country's (country j) pro…t functions for exports to country z (another spoke country), denoted by iz and jz respectively, can be written as:
Similarly, a spoke country's export pro…t function in the hub country can be written as:
6 It is immediate under global free trade that the two stage game is reduced to a one stage game and the tari¤s we use in the below discussion disappear. 7 It is important to note from the literature on trade policy under imperfect competition that results are highly sensitive to the choice and functional form of policy instruments. For example, as shown by Brander and Spencer (1984) , and further discussed by Jørgensen and Schröder (2005) , whether the policy is ad-valorem or speci…c could matter even for the sign of welfare improving intervention.
First order conditions (FOCs) for pro…t maximization for exporters are
The above FOCs together with an analogous condition for the local …rms determine the equilibrium output levels of all …rms. Summing the FOCs for all …rms in country i gives
Using the second order conditions (S.O.Cs) of pro…t maximization problems and the strategic substitutability, we can derive: 8
In other words, an increase in t z lowers a spoke country j's exports to another spoke county z (x jz )
while it increases the sales of the hub …rm (x iz ) and that of the local sales denoted by x zz .Welfare of a spoke country z can be written as the sum of its domestic surplus s z (t z ) (sum of consumer surplus, tari¤ revenue, and the domestic …rm's local pro…ts) and total export pro…ts:
while the welfare of the hub country is the sum of consumer surplus, domestic …rm's local pro…ts and total export pro…ts:
Finally, world welfare under hfihgi is de…ned as:
Welfare maximization problem of a spoke country (say country z) is as follows:
so that
Next, we show a new interesting possibility that arises under oligopoly model of trade with asymmetric cost: the hub and spoke trading regime hfihgi can yield higher world welfare than global free trade and the optimum tari¤ s spoke countries impose can be optimal from the viewpoint of global welfare maximization. To this end, consider the impact of spoke countries' external tari¤s under the trade regime hfihgi on world welfare. Using market segmentation and equation (10) we can write @ww(t) @t
In other words, when tari¤ s are optimally chosen by spoke countries, a further increase in the external tari¤ s increases world welfare i¤ they increase the total export pro…ts in the world economy.
Note that
i.e. an increase in the tari¤ on its rival exporters increases hub country's export pro…ts in its export markets.
Similarly,
i.e. an increase in t z lowers its export pro…ts in other spoke countries. Since spoke countries are completely symmetric, from the hub country's perspective, a small increase in the tari¤ faced by one of its exporting rivals is the same as an equivalent increase in the tari¤ faced by the other rival exporter. Therefore, at t z = t f , the …rst order condition for world welfare maximization in (11) can be written as
which is of ambiguous sign if countries are asymmetric. 9 If the …rst term in the above expression (denoted by ) exceeds the second term (denoted by ), an increase in tari¤s ine¢ cient spoke countries impose on each other improves world welfare. Moreover, FTA tari¤s (t f ) under hfihgi are optimal from the viewpoint of global welfare maximization i¤ = .
We next provide an illustration of this result and the related ones using linear demand. 9 Under symmetry, it is clear that
x jz . Under a hub and spoke regime hfihgi, …rst order conditions for pro…t maximization yield the following equilibrium output levels in the hub country (country i) and spoke countries:
x ii (ih) = 1 + (n 1)c n + 1 and x zi (ih) = 1 2c n + 1 , z 6 = i:
and x iz (ih) = 1 + (n 1)c + (n 2)t z n + 1 ; x zz (ih) = 1 2c + (n 2)t z n + 1 ; x jz (ih) = 1 2c 3t z n + 1 , z 6 = i and j 6 = i; z
Given these output levels, equilibrium prices are immediate:
Next, we …nd the welfare of the hub and spoke countries and the aggregate world welfare as follows:
Then, the following tari¤ maximizes each spoke country's welfare:
Note that as c rises, the spoke countries become less e¢ cient, becoming a less important rent extraction source and the optimum tari¤s they impose on each other fall. From hereon, in order to guarantee non-negative tari¤ rates and the market access of spoke …rms in their export markets, we assume that c < c = 3 n+7 holds. Do the individual countries bene…t from a hub and spoke trade agreement relative to free trade?
To address this question, we …rst argue below that a hub and spoke trade agreement hfihgi makes the hub country better o¤ and the spoke countries worse o¤ relative to global free trade. To see why, …rst note that starting at free trade, if spoke countries were to switch to independent bilateral FTAs with only country i, export pro…ts of the hub country would increase in all its export markets because in each of its export markets, country i's rival exporters would face the tari¤ t f whereas it itself would not. Furthermore, the domestic surplus of country i under hfihgi is the same as that under free trade since it has a bilateral FTA with all of its trading partners: s i (ih) = 0. As a result, country i's welfare under hfihgi is necessarily higher than that under free trade:
The ‡ip side of this result is that the spoke countries are worse o¤ under hfihgi relative to global free trade:
This result provides a con…rmation for the argument that the hub country bene…ts at the expense of the spoke countries. These welfare results are important because most countries belong to multiple FTAs and focusing only on a bilateral FTA is unlikely to yield a complete picture regarding their welfare e¤ects. These results also shed light on how the formation of independent FTAs a¤ects incentives for multilateral trade liberalization. Since spoke countries'welfare under hfihgi is lower than that under free trade, they would surely gain from a move to global free trade.
Next, we compare the world welfare under the hub and spoke regime hfihgi and free trade hfF gi and …nd that the hub and spoke regime yields higher global welfare relative to free trade when spoke countries are su¢ ciently high cost:
Note that the above possibility is more likely to arise as the number of spoke countries rises: @c @n < 0. Figures 1a, 1b , and 1c plot ww(ih) as a function of c for three distinct numbers of spoke countries.
- Figures 1a, 1b , and 1c hereWe also …nd under hfihgi that there exists a positive world welfare maximizing tari¤ level (t w ) that spoke countries impose on each other when spoke countries are su¢ ciently high cost:
More interestingly, at t = t f , the …rst order condition for world welfare maximization in (14) can be rewritten as @ww(t) @t Given that the intuition and the implications of the …rst part of the above proposition was explained before, we next focus on the intuition behind the last two parts of the proposition. The …rst point to note for these striking results is that the assumption that …rms compete in quantities plays a crucial role in delivering these results. As is well known, under quantity competition …rms with di¤erent production costs can remain active in production so long as demand is big enough.
From a world welfare perspective, the external tari¤s under hfihgi have two con ‡icting e¤ects on world welfare. On the one hand, such tari¤s tend to lower world welfare relative to free trade since they adversely a¤ect the exports of spoke countries. On the other hand, FTA tari¤s shift production in favor of the low cost country i and this improves allocative e¢ ciency. What the above proposition argues and Figures 1 and 2 con…rm is that it is quite possible for the latter e¤ect to dominate the former. It is immediate from …gure 2 that f is decreasing in c while the opposite is true for w . The intuition is as follows: as c rises, spoke countries'incentives to impose tari¤s on each other decreases since they become less important sources of rent-extraction and thus f falls.
On the other hand, w maximizes world welfare and thus internalizes allocative e¢ ciency e¤ect leading to higher tari¤s as c rises.
Here, it is important to note that FTA between the spoke countries always increases their welfare. Although the hub country su¤ers from the spoke-spoke FTA, it can not directly prevent the spoke-spoke FTA and thus the realization of global free trade. Hence, even if a hub and spoke trade system realizes higher world welfare, the system is not stable and the equilibrium outcome would be global free trade if we consider endogenous formation of FTAs. Taking the sustainability problem into account, the policy implications of this result needs further attention. This result may suggest that international transfers from the hub country to the spoke countries are useful to prevent the spoke-spoke FTA and improve world welfare. The result also indicates that, even if global free trade is realized in the long run, a temporary formation of a hub and spoke trade system may lead to an interim improvement of world welfare.
Concluding remarks
One of the striking features of today's global policy landscape is the widespread prevalence of PTAs.
Most of the countries simultaneously participate in several such agreements leading to several huband-spoke trading systems. In this paper we aim at shedding light on the welfare implications of hub and spoke trade regimes relative to free trade. We show that, under an oligopoly model of trade with asymmetric costs, a hub and spoke trading arrangement increases the e¢ cient hub country's
welfare even beyond what it can obtain under global free trade while making ine¢ cient spokes worse o¤. Second, such an arrangement can be welfare-preferred to global free trade if the hub country is su¢ ciently low cost compared to the spoke countries since the trade diversion inherent to such a regime enhances the e¢ ciency of global production. It is important to note that since a CU member cannot form an additional PTA with non-members without a consent of the other member, such an outcome is never possible under a customs union. The major results of the paper obtain in a framework where independent FTAs in the form of a hub and spoke regime are exogenously given.
In order to obtain more complete picture, one should endogenize trade agreement formation. We intend to pursue this research in near future.
